Basil of Caesarea — Homily on Psalm 14

The strongest patristic witness for the content claim and the clearest against the address claim, in one homily. Basil reaches for the judicial statute in its statutory particularity — and then tells his hearers he is not laying down law.

Tension. Stacks the Mosaic judicial statute alongside Ezekiel and the Psalm as one continuous authority, then expressly declines to legislate from it — “I do not speak thus to lay down the law.” The statute binds the conscience it no longer binds the city, and no reason is given why it should still bind at all.

In depicting the character of the perfect man, of him, that is, who is ordained to ascend to the life of everlasting peace, the prophet reckons among his noble deeds his never having given his money upon usury. This particular sin is condemned in many passages of Scripture. Ezekiel reckons taking usury and increase among the greatest of crimes. The law distinctly utters the prohibition “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother” and to thy neighbour. Again it is said, “Usury upon usury; guile upon guile.” And of the city abounding in a multitude of wickednesses, what does the Psalm say? “Usury and guile depart not from her streets.”

But, you ask, how am I to live? You have hands. You have a craft. Work for wages. Go into service.

Listen, you rich men, to the kind of advice I am giving to the poor because of your inhumanity. Far better endure under their dire straits than undergo the troubles that are bred of usury! But if you were obedient to the Lord, what need of these words?

I do not speak thus to lay down the law. I only wish to point out that any course is more advantageous to you than borrowing.

Comment

The content claim, confirmed. Basil does not condemn usury as an instance of greed. He opens by stacking four authorities — Ps. 15:5, Ezekiel, the Mosaic prohibition in its statutory wording, and Ps. 55:11 — as a single continuous body of law, and the Mosaic statute sits in the middle of it without apology or hedge. This is a father treating a judicial provision as still saying something true about what justice requires, three centuries after the polity that enacted it had ceased.

The address claim, refuted in the author’s own words. The homily is preached in the second person singular, by turns to the would-be borrower (you have hands, you have a craft) and to the rich lender (listen, you rich men). And Basil forecloses the legislative reading himself: “I do not speak thus to lay down the law.” He is not asking Valens for a statute. He is asking the man in front of him not to do this.

Interest-taking was legal throughout Basil’s lifetime and remained legal for centuries after. He knew that, preached against it anyway, and did not petition for its prohibition. That is the patristic pattern in miniature.

What is missing is the bridge. If the judicial law expired with the Jewish polity, the statute has no claim on a Cappadocian congregation; if it has a claim, some principle must carry it across, and Basil never names one. The Reformed tradition would later name it — what is founded on the light of nature, on reason, and on justice and equity — and build an apparatus on it. Basil uses the criterion without possessing it.